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Riassunto
Qualificare la psicologia, rispettare la religione: La distintività della psicologia della religione
Si presentano alcune considerazioni a riguardo della psicologia della religione quale settore speci-
fico e autonomo di indagine psicologica. Si sostiene la necessità, da una parte, di definire correttamente
l’oggetto di studio, la religione e, dall’altra parte, di difendere l’approccio psicologico, in quanto psi-
cologico, dal riduzionismo neurobiologico o dall’annessionismo psico-sociologico. Ciò che interessa
lo psicologo della religione non è la religione per sé, ma ciò che accade nella psiche/mente dell’uomo
quando si relazione alla religione che incontra nella propria cultura. La religione dell’individuo si
distingue dalla spiritualità, dalla ricerca di significato, dalla mindfulness per la sua caratteristica
peculiare: la convinzione soggettiva di essere in relazione con il Trascendente. Questa convinzione
si manifesta in credenze, sentimenti, relazioni, atti cultuali, comportamenti normati. Da una parte ciò
riguarda strettamente il vissuto individuale, dall’altra trova realizzazione in una cultura specifica con
forme religiose istituzionali ed un linguaggio simbolico-culturale determinato sia nel tempo che nello
spazio. Ciò richiede una prospettiva psicodinamica e clinica della psicologia della religione, accanto
a quella socio-culturale. L’attuale successo della psicologia sociale della religione viene ripensato
criticamente nelle sue opportunità e sfide.
Parole chiave: Psicologia della religione, Religione vs spiritualità, Neuroscienze, Psicologia sociale
Abstract
Some remarks about psychology of religion meant as a specific and autonomous domain are
reported. The need of defining the object of investigation (religion) in a proper way and of defending
the peculiarity of the approach (psychology) against the neurobiological and sociological reductionisms
is stressed. The psychologist is interested not in religion itself, but in what occurs in human mind when
religion is encountered within a culture (that is, religiosity). It is argued that religion is different from spi-
rituality, search for meaning, mindfulness and so on since it is characterised by the subjective conviction
to be in relation with the Transcendent. Such a conviction is expressed in beliefs, feelings, interpersonal
relationships, rituals, normative behaviours. On one hand these aspects concern individual experience
and, on the other hand, they are instantiated in a specific culture, with its own institutions, symbols and
language, which develop in a given spatial-temporal context. This implies that a clinical and psychody-
namic perspective, beside the sociocultural one, has to be taken into account. The current success of
the social psychology of religion is critically examined by considering its potentialities and limits.
Keywords: Psychology of religion, Religion vs spirituality, Neurosciences, Social psychology
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Looking for Distinctiveness
Today, the “return to religion” is strongly
emphasized by social media. Terms such as “de-
secularization” and “post-secularization”, “return
of the soul”, “need to believe” are often repor-
ted in newspapers and magazines. Religious fun-
damentalism, with the associated political claims,
is an issue which is addressed in TV broadcasts.
Post-transcendent spirituality, “religion after religion”
(Hood, 2012, p. 110,) and “religion without God”
(Dworkin, 2013) are topics which are debated in web
forums. In this context there is a renewed interest in
what psychology can say about the “religious” (in-
cluding religion, religiosity and spirituality, but also
atheism, superstition, and fundamentalism). The at-
tention currently paid to the psychology of religion
is also motivated by the fact that such a field is now
considered part of mainstream psychology.
But not everything that is said and written about
the “religion”, even by some psychologists, can be
considered as genuine psychology of religion. In our
paper we would like to share some reflections - which
might be divergent from the common approach and
which we hope might be provocative - about the psy-
chology of religion as a specific and independent
research field within psychology. The distinctiveness
of the psychology of religion implies, on one hand,
the respect of the specific psychological methodo-
logies and, on the other hand, the acknowledgment
of the specificity of the cultural manifestations of
the different religions, each considered in its cultural
context (Aletti, 2012b).
For example, the application of a psychological
model to issues concerning religion can be aimed at
further confirming a psychological theory which has
already been verified in other fields, not-involving
religion. It might be the case of a study about the im-
pact of gender differences in the teenagers’ attitudes
towards prayer which could not be more than a de-
velopmental psychology study focused on cognitive
aspects. Similarly, investigating changes in neurolo-
gical processes concurrent to mental activity during
meditation can be aimed at understanding how the
brain works, but not how religious meditation affects
personality. As a further example, a survey on pil-
grimages can be only a study of social psychology
applied to a tourism destination of devotion (Lour-
des, Medjugorje, Mecca, the Santiago route and so
on); it would be a study belonging to the psycho-
logy of religion only if it investigates the specific
feelings experienced by people and how their devo-
tion influences others experiences and personality
processes.
The debate on the definition of the object of
the psychology of religion is broad and articulated
(Aletti, 2010, pp. 29-47; Belzen, 2005). We will try
to express our point of view, although we will not
have space enough to argue in detail. The psychology
of religion is the branch of psychology which investi-
gates – using psychological paradigms, methods, and
tools – what is psychological in religion. It does not
investigate religion as such, but the personality of the
believer, his or her experiences and the interactions
of those experiences with the whole mental life. The
psychology of religion does not explain the essence
and origin of religion as the psychology of language
does not explain what language is. Human beings do
not create religion, as they do not create language:
they acquire it through the interaction between their
minds and the cultural environment. If, on one hand,
the psychologist must take into account the status
of religion as an aspect of culture, in which the per-
son interacts, on the other hand the psychological
approach focuses on the experience of the subject.
There is therefore a need to clarify what is spe-
cific in religious experience to avoid reducing it to
more general processes and attitudes. In other words,
the specificity of religious experience, compared to
other kinds of experience, has to be stressed. From
the point of view of the subject, believing in a su-
pernatural entity involves processing certain beliefs
(about the existence of a deity, the immortality etc.),
sharing unique experiences (feelings of inner peace,
mystical states etc.), and taking special behaviors
(praying, taking part in rituals etc.). So, have these
beliefs, experiences, and behaviors something speci-
fic which make them parts of a different category, or
are they forms and manifestations of broader types of
beliefs, experiences, and behaviors? The belief in a
divine being has the same connotations as the belief
in the existence of controversial entities like UFOs
or the Lockness monster? Is the personal experience
of the believer when he or she feels to be in special
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relationship with the deity similar to consciousness
states experienced through other non-religiously con-
noted practices such as the state of flow, mindfulness,
or reverie? Does belonging to a religion involve atti-
tudes and behavior – from both an individual and a
social point of view – which are analogous to those
associated with sharing a given political ideology or
to militancy in a social organization?
The distinctiveness of the psychology of religion
seems to depend on the specificity and irreducibility
of the mental phenomena related to the experience
with the divine; otherwise it would risk being “bro-
ken up” into a series of sections of the psychology of
consciousness, cognitive psychology, psychology of
emotion, social psychology, developmental psycho-
logy, clinical psychology, and so forth.
Obviously, the subjective belief of being in rela-
tionship with a transcendent being or agent cannot
be anchored to the demonstration of the existence of
an external reality, which is different from the per-
ception or subjective belief or faith. The existence of
God cannot be proved by the psychology, as Flour-
noy (1902) claimed by formulating the principle of
the methodological exclusion of the Transcend: God
is excluded from psychological inquiry, both as an
object of study and as an interpretation or explanation
criterion of mental phenomena.
Psychology of Religion and/or Psychology
of Spirituality
Recently in psychology the topic of religion has
been assimilated to that of “spirituality“. Perhaps this
is an attempt to defend the psychology of religion
and offer through a more trendy name, a version of
the psychology of religion which is more acceptable
to the modern mentality, especially the psychological
one, and in particular the American one. This raises
the question whether the assimilation of religion to
spirituality is not likely to produce a lack of distinc-
tiveness. From a conceptual point of view, in fact,
there may be a spiritual life – involving meditation,
compassion, altruism etc. – even in those who do not
believe in a supernatural being, and, conversely, a
religious orientation is not necessarily accompanied
by a particular spirituality.
The question of the relationships between reli-
gion and spirituality is extremely controversial: the
two concepts are considered by some to be synonyms.
According to other investigators they are intersecting,
whereas others claim that they are opposed. Accor-
ding to some, the distinction between religion and
spirituality corresponds with the distinction between
institutional and personal, between external and inn-
ner, between beliefs and emotions, between truth and
authenticity. These distinctions often shift from a
descriptive to an evaluative approach, and then in
ideological considerations on society and religion.
The so-called “post-modern spirituality” (a sugges-
tive expression which however lacks conceptual cla-
rity) seems to consider the transcendent as an inner
psychic reality, a psychological feeling of belonging
to an invisible reality, which exceeds the totality of
observable things and the world of everyday experi-
ence, without including the cognitive postulate of a
transcendent and personal God.
Someone (Paiva, 2005; Westerink, 2012), for
the sake of conceptual clarity, proposed the distinc-
tion between theistic spirituality (which corresponds
to the psychology of religion) and non-theistic spi-
rituality (which corresponds to the psychology of
spirituality). Others, like Salander (2012), more ra-
dically argue that the concept of “spirituality” is
unnecessary and confusing. This opinion seems to
be worth sharing since the concept of “spirituality”
– widespread in the American literature but most
criticized in Europe – has so many and such different
meanings. It is used to denotate the public or private
devotion to God, the subjective and inner experience
of self-transcendence, the dedication to the humanist
values of brotherhood and solidarity, meditation and
the practices addressed to the inner discovery of
the true self, the techniques to enhance the human
potential, the capacity to give meaning to life, the
search for physical and psychological well-being,
the respect towards animals (with associated food
practices such as vegetarianism), the ability to “think
positive” in every life event etc. Used in so many
senses, the concept of “spirituality” is no longer
useful. With reference to the fairy tale by Andersen,
it would say that the emperor, if not quite naked, is
certainly badly dressed!
We think that it is necessary to distinguish reli-
gion from spirituality and that the latter tends to lead
to a general, vague psychological attitude. We think
that it is necessary to distinguish between the uni-
versal search for meaning and that specific response,
neither necessary nor universal, to the search for me-
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aning that is the religious response. In our Western
culture religion is that specific answer to the general
search for meaning according to which the Transcen-
dent is the source of meaning and the ultimate value.
Such a response has specific connotations (beliefs,
symbols, rituals, ethical principles) according to the
different historical and cultural, linguistic, and sym-
bolic contexts (Antonietti & Iannello, 2013). What
is discriminating in this definition is the relationship
(religion) that the believer has with the transcendent,
the “radically Other” (R. Otto). The reference to the
transcendent implies, according to Gordon W. All-
port, the identification of an absolute value, which
acts as the core element of the “comprehensive philo-
sophy of live” that is essential for a mature semtiment
(Allport, 1950, pp. 67-70). A religion which is really
“intrinsic” is dynamic, comprehensive, productive of
consistent morality, and fundamentally heuristic.
The openness to the transcendent, that believers
ground in religious values, is available for atheists
in humanistic values, which play the role of a “re-
placement” of the absolute, even though they are
qualitatively different from religion, in spite of being
functionally similar to it. Believing in a personal
relationship with God the Father is different from
believing in an ideology, a mission, a destiny, or a
feeling of being immersed in everything around us.
(With this comment Allport already envisaged a pos-
sible solution to the problem of the relations between
religion and spirituality. Unfortunately his theoretical
background is ignored by many of those who men-
tion the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in religion, that
is reduced to a sociological survey tool.
This option of defining as religious only the at-
titude to make reference to the Transcendent helps
to clarify the subject of the psychology of religion
while limiting the field. It leads us to exclude that
religion, meant as the subject of the empirical psy-
chology, is an “inner” dimension of personality or
an anthropological proprium, as philosophers argue
when they speak about the alleged homo religious or
a specific form of “intelligence” (Emmons, 2000). It
also prevents us from identifying religion with an in-
ner “religious sense” or “spirituality” or a search for
ultimate meaning (“ultimate concern“), or that it is a
dimension of personality, a kind of a sixth factor next
to the big five. It also prevents us investigating a gene-
ric “average religion “ or religious sentiment (which
would – according to some – underlie all the diffe-
rent cultural and historical forms of religion) and,
consequently, to develop tests of religiosity which
should be valid in all cultural and symbolic contexts
regardless of the historical and geographical aspects.
Many prefer to think of religion as a social
and cultural phenomenon, historically (and geo-
graphically) bounded, which human beings approach
with all the aspects of their personality and their
personal story.
On the other hand thinking of religion as a res-
ponse to the need for meaning it implies that people
sometimes speak of religion as a meaning system.
Psychology should preferably put the emphasis on
the religiosity of the individual as a religious mea-
ning making, to emphasize, again, the decisive impor-
tance of the subjective process in the appropriation of
the cultural phenomenon. The expression “meaning
system” stresses the institutionalization and sedimen-
tation of beliefs, meanings, worship, and community
organization, whereas the expression “meaning ma-
king” emphasizes the creative component that esta-
blishes the religiosity of the individual.
Psychology: In defense of the Autonomy
It seems appropriate to defend the psychological
approach against the neurobiological reductionism
and the sociological annexionism.
Once established that the religious disposition
towards reality has its own specificity as compared
to other forms in which individuals and communities
are open and enter into a relationship with the world,
the challenge is to understand if the psychological
investigation concerns a level that is irreducible to
the one explored by the neurosciences. Claiming that
prayer or meditation, as everything that occurs in
the mind, has a neurobiological counterpart is trivial.
However, in order to identify such a counterpart, psy-
chology is still necessary to define and describe the
mental phenomenon of which neurosciences try to
identify the concurrent biological process. Mental
experience of mind, even if it were an illusory expe-
rience (as an epiphenomenon of brain processes), it
is something that happens to someone and as such
deserves to be taken into consideration, even if the
intention was to not to stop at the description in men-
talistic terms but to go beyond in order to discover
the corresponding brain processes (Antonietti, 2008).
Having established that psychological descripti-
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ons are necessary to match mental experiences and
neurobiological processes, we must wonder if, once
you set the psychological definition of the mental
phenomenon to be investigated, such a definition can
then be discarded and only the description of the con-
current neurobiological process has to be kept. In the
scientific investigation of material things it makes
sense to proceed from appearance to a deeper reality
which is assumed to be objective, independent from
our senses. In contrast, in the case of the mind it
is not possible to move from appearance to an alle-
ged deeper reality, because the subjective appearance
is the essence of the mental (Antonietti, 2006). For
instance, painfulness is not a contingent property of
pain; painfulness is the essence of pain. If you feel a
pain, the sensation of pain is in all respects what you
feel; it makes no sense to say that pain is actually a
brain process.
The correspondences between psychological phe-
nomena and neurobiological processes are usually
mentioned as evidence supporting the specificity of
mental attitudes. However, such specificity can often
be supported in other ways. For instance the reduced
distinction of the boundaries between the reality and
the self and the lack of spatial orientation which ac-
company meditation – which, according to D’Aquili
and Newberg (1998), are correlated with a reduced
activity in the posterior parietal lobe – were already
well known on the basis of psychological investi-
gation. For example, in the case of the epilepsy of
the temporal lobe, neurobiological data prove that
a “religious” experience such as that of these pati-
ents is special with respect to everyday life because
the brain is in a special state when it occurs. But
this type of experience was already known to be spe-
cial, independently of neurobiological data, since
thoughts, interests, attitudes, and behaviours testified
abundantly in favour of its specialness. It comes as
no surprise that a special psychological experience
is accompanied by a special neural state (Antonietti,
2005). It could instead be interesting to discover that
– the example is completely fictitious – the patients
in question systematically show, during an epileptic
seizure or between seizures, either a N1 neurobio-
logical activation or a N2 activation. This could be
the evidence of two different forms of “contact” with
the divine that had not been revealed at a psycholo-
gical level. A more detailed reconstruction of what
patients experience or think could thus lead us to
identify a psychological contact characterized by the
sensation of understanding the mystery of reality (a
predominantly intellective contact) and a contact cha-
racterized by the sensation of serenity and beauty (a
predominantly emotive-aesthetic contact). The diffe-
rentiations suggested by neurobiological data would
need however to be proved on the psychological le-
vel by introspective accounts, analysis of attitudes,
assessment of facial expressions, study of linguistic
expressions, and so on (Antonietti & Iannello, 2011).
With regard to the approach of social psycho-
logy to religion, one might wonder whether, how
and in what social psychology of religion qualifies
itself within social psychology and is distinguished,
for example, from social psychology of other ide-
ological systems (Deconchy, 2011). Psychology of
religion is not social psychology applied to religious
events and behavior, as well as social psychology
could be applied to other observable behaviors in
politics, education, family, advertising, and so on.
If, on the one hand, psychology of religion invol-
ves the reference to a cultural phenomenon which is
defined as “religion” (institutionalization of beliefs,
worship, organization, symbolic language), on the
other hand it is essential the phenomenological un-
derstanding of the intentionality which is constitutive
of mental experiences concerning religion and their
interaction with other experiences, processes, and
dynamics of personality. Moreover, even the recent
book Religion, personality and social behavior edi-
ted by Vassilis Saroglou (2014) shows the need to
connect the religious attitude (even though it mani-
fests itself in socially visible behaviors, as it relates
to culture, language, symbols) to the psychology of
personality.
Surveys concerning traditional socio-demograph-
ic indicators – attendance at the services, belonging
to a group, self-reported religious involvement, and
adhesion to beliefs – are only the preliminary steps
of the investigation of religious experience and se-
ems to be inadequate to grasp the true dimensions
of religiosity, its psychic motives, its effects. The
ease of the use of tools that allow investigators to
reach a large number of respondents (such as online
questionnaires) does not guarantee, however, rese-
archers about the methodological correctness and
validity of the conclusions of their studies meant as
pieces of “psychology of religion“. Psychology of
religion requires constant attention to combine the
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“quantitative” approach with an interpretative, “phe-
nomenological” perspective, in compliance with both
the specific and distinctive intentionality of religious
conduct (towards the Transcendent) and the peculi-
arities of the environment and the cultural context
in which it occurs and is institutionalized as a cult,
ritual, organization.
Toward a Psychodynamic Approach
This draws attention to the psychodynamic perso-
nal attitude towards religion. Religious individuality
is built across a process of personal appropriation
which involves both recognition and distance, diffe-
rentiation and otherness with respect to the specific
form of religion which people meet in the culture
they live in. The great pediatrician and psychoanalyst
Donald W. Winnicott (1953) taught us that the child
“creates” the mother that he or she finds (that is to
say, that woman was already there, but she was not
the “mother” of that child until the child enters into
a relationship with her, recognizing her as different
from himself). You could apply this idea arguing that
in religion “the believer creates the God that he or she
finds“. That is to say that our relationship with God
and our religiosity are structured in a complex “po-
tential space” which is also a function of the personal
context, starting from primary emotional experiences.
We are not born as fully religious, but we become
so through a constant exchange and co-building with
the surrounding cultural environment, the interaction
between the internal and subjective world and the
real world outside us (Aletti, 2005).
This dynamic and constructivist view gives the
reason for the many expressions of religion, of its
acceptance or rejection, and also of many processes
and conflicts that occur when human beings appro-
ach religion within their own cultural environment.
The model would explain, for example, the fact that
the personal attitude of the believer is always in
dialectical tension with the institutionalized forms
of religion (dogma, worship, organization), carving
out an “intermediate zone” between subjectivity and
objectivity. The model also takes into account the in-
teraction between religious rites and symbols and the
personal process of sense making, which may explain
both the adhesion as the negation of belief, as well
as its use in de-viated and per-verse and/or creative
and innovative forms which go beyond the current
symbolic institutional systems (Aletti, Fagnani, &
Colombo, 1998).
Hence the need of a dialogue with theology for
the knowledge of the contents of religion that are
investigated from a psychological standpoint. In this
respect the sense of alienation denounced by the beli-
ever when he or she realizes the traits with which psy-
chologists, sociologists and philosophers describe his
or her faith is worth considering. On the other side,
people playing relevant roles in the Church (such as
pastors and theologians) express their disapproval
when reading reports of psychological studies that
appear to them to be irrelevant or fragmentary since
they fail to grasp what is really the essence of “their”
religion. Researchers must pay attention to this criti-
cism. The ongoing dialogue with both believers and
theologians helps psychologists to deconstruct their
conceptual categories and to continously test the va-
lidity of their research instruments, although they are
consolidated tool (Aletti, 2012a).
The lack of research on concrete religious beha-
viors and the prevailing focus on general, abstract
concepts such as “religion”, “spirituality”, “funda-
mentalism” and their structural dimensions is one of
the difficulties that the psychology of religion faces
today. We must pay attention to the fact that religions
are not equal. They are equal in the sense that they all
have the same right to be practiced and recognized;
although they are very different in their system of be-
liefs, their symbolic language, and as a consequence
of this, in their roots and in their interactions, with
psychic structures and processes. Therefore psycholo-
gists of religion should refrain from their research on
abstract concepts (religion, spirituality, fundamenta-
lism etc.) made with samples, based on easy-to-reach
college students and should observe more closely the
daily practice of religion. In other words, they must
go inside churches, inside synagogues, inside mos-
ques. This is not to increase their faith, but simply to
become true psychologists of religion!
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